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From Dublin to Lisbon: Ireland’s EU Reform 
Treaty Referendums and Their Lessons for 
Europe
Katelyn Walker
The Irish people were long thought to be among the most enthusiastic Europeans. 
Since 1988, Eurobarometer polling1 has shown that Irish citizens are significantly more 
likely to view their country’s membership in the European Union (EU) as a good thing than 
citizens of other countries. Since the mid-1990s, approval of EU membership in Ireland was 
often twenty points higher than the EU average (Sinnott, Elkink, O’Rourke & McBride, 
2009, p. 2). Despite this, a low turnout of voters rejected the EU’s Treaty of Nice in 20012, 
and a relatively high turnout of voters rejected the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 (Ibid, p. 6). 
The latter referendum launched a sense of “political groundhog’s day” (O’Brennan, 2009, 
p. 270), as Irish politicians and European elites tried to discern how a country that has self-
admittedly benefited so much from EU membership could squash the very reforms needed 
to make the Union operate more effectively—twice. 
When asked why the Irish voted against the Treaty of Lisbon, former Irish Prime 
Minister John Bruton explained that the Irish view the European Union through their 
pocketbooks rather than through their hearts (2008). They had not been as affected by sev-
eral shared European traumas (such as the Cold War and the two World Wars) as had the 
states in the geographic core of Europe. Thus, as many European states sought peace and 
prosperity from the Union, Ireland primarily sought prosperity. This analysis explains the 
referendum results for both treaties to some extent. Given that Ireland had recently joined 
the ranks of the wealthy nations within the European Union, it had achieved its goal of 
prosperity. By 2001, Ireland had grown so wealthy that it would lose many of its subsidies, 
thus removing the factor that had previously driven many Irish both to vote and vote yes in 
referendums on European Treaties. Ireland needed to re-evaluate its role in the European 
Union, and a new equilibrium within the electorate on European reform treaties would 
1 Eurobarometer is a biannual series of public opinion polling released about the European Union and its member 
states.
2 Another referendum on the Treaty of Nice was held in 2002, and a much higher turnout of voters approved the 
treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, 6).
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logically follow. This search for a new role in Europe came at a time when Irish campaign 
laws were changing, several domestic concerns dominated, and outreach and education of 
European issues remained poor. This proved to be a toxic combination for the ‘Yes’ cam-
paigns for both the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon.  
This paper discusses why the Irish voted against Nice and Lisbon, focusing particu-
larly on the Treaty of Lisbon. The first section briefly chronicles the history of European 
reform efforts since 2000 and summarizes the changes proposed in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
next section analyzes the debate over the necessity of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
in Ireland, arguing that a referendum was politically unavoidable even if it was potentially 
not constitutionally mandated. The following section addresses several causes of the ‘No’ 
votes in the Irish referendums on both Nice and Lisbon and discusses two issues that played 
a particularly important role solely in the first Lisbon referendum. The next section discusses 
why Ireland overturned its decision in the second referendum on Lisbon. To conclude, this 
paper discusses the need for a common curriculum on European Union issues.
European Reform Efforts in the 21st Century 
As the European Union prepared to extend membership to several eastern Euro-
pean nations, EU leaders realized that extensive institutional reform would be necessary 
to streamline operations in an enlarged Union. Specifically, the existing fifteen members 
sought to reduce the size of the European Commission, remove unanimity requirements 
for decision-making in several topic areas, and establish the number of votes each member 
state would carry in the European Parliament and Council post-enlargement. The Treaty 
of Nice emerged in 2002 as the first attempt at reform; however, many viewed the treaty 
as a flawed and temporary compromise among states pursuing only their national interests 
(Dinan, 2005, pp. 170-171). The governments of Europe consolidated all existing treaties 
and proposed reforms into the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (commonly 
known as the EU Constitution) in 2004, but voters in France and the Netherlands rejected 
the treaty in 2005. Lawmakers repackaged most of the constitutional reforms into the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which was ratified in late 2009.
Many of the reforms contained within the Lisbon Treaty are technical, complicated, 
and unglamorous. Generally speaking, reformers sought to increase the EU’s efficiency, 
grant a larger role to the member states, address the perceived democratic deficit within the 
EU, and pursue more areas of cooperation. Some of the key reforms are summarized below:
 
• A thirty-month presidency of the European Council (elected by the Council it-
self) will replace the current six-month rotating presidency.
• A “High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” will be appointed. 
• The Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding. 
• The number of commissioners in the European Commission will be reduced to 
two-thirds the number of member states, abolishing the current system of univer-
sal Commission representation3. However, the Lisbon Treaty allows the European 
Council to unanimously decide to have a different number of commissioners. 
• Decisions in more areas will be made by qualified majority voting (QMV). 
• National parliaments will have an official mechanism to review and challenge EU 
3 However, the Treaty of Nice required that the number of European Commissioners be reduced to an unspecified 
number when the EU has 27 members. The 27th member of the EU joined in 2007.
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legislation. 
• Member states should pledge to defend one another in the instance of an armed 
attack or natural disaster4.   
• Should the member states unanimously approve, the EU may develop a common 
defense5. 
Was a Referendum Necessary in Ireland? 
The Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice proved what few thought possible: that 
the Irish people would vote against a European treaty despite holding the EU in generally 
high regard. Irish academics therefore briefly considered the possibility that Ireland not hold 
a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, lest history repeat itself. The 1986 Irish Supreme 
Court Case Crotty vs. An Taoiseach established that European treaties that significantly alter 
“the essential scope or objectives” of the EU must be amended to the Irish Constitution, 
which can only be amended by referendum. In its decision, the Court found that Title III of 
the Single European Act violated the Irish Constitution by introducing measures to increase 
cooperation in the realm of foreign policy. However, other aspects of the Single European 
Act—such as changes to qualified majority rules and expansions of the EU-level court sys-
tem—were not found to be a violation of the Irish Constitution (Fanning, 2008, para. 8).
Since the decision, all reform treaties have been put to a vote. Accession treaties, how-
ever, have been ratified by the parliament, which undermines the commonly held view-
point that all EU treaties must be submitted to a referendum in Ireland. One can interpret 
the Crotty ruling to mean that Ireland must amend its constitution to give the European 
Union entirely new responsibilities, but no amendment is necessary to approve changes to 
existing powers. Given this interpretation, it is not so clear that the Lisbon Treaty is uncon-
stitutional, especially when one considers that the Crotty ruling did not reject changes in 
qualified majority voting structures (which would most arguably impinge upon Irish sov-
ereignty). The Lisbon Treaty altered the structure of the EU in several ways, but it did not 
create entirely new responsibilities. Other contentious portions of the Lisbon Treaty, such 
as the loss of a permanent commissioner and increased peacekeeping responsibilities, existed 
in the Nice Treaty. The legal debate is whether Ireland would need to resubmit questions 
to the Irish voters that they have already considered (multiple times, in some cases) when 
they appear in new treaties. 
No legal precedent has since been established for the use of parliamentary ratification 
procedures for European reform treaties. The Irish government is understandably reluc-
tant to challenge the conventional wisdom on treaty ratifications because the consequences 
would be great if the government were to get it wrong. If the parliament ratified the Lisbon 
Treaty without a referendum, the same parties that brought about the Crotty lawsuit would 
surely launch a legal challenge to the Treaty. Should the Supreme Court determine that the 
Lisbon Treaty did, in fact, constitute a significant enough change to the nature of the Eu-
ropean Union to require a referendum, it would be difficult for politicians to convince the 
public to vote for the treaty that they had tried to pass above the voters’ heads. 
Such a judgment would also pose serious logistical problems to the EU at large if the 
4 Neutral states are exempt, and NATO members are expected to fulfill this pledge through NATO.
5 For more information on these and other provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, please see the Department of Foreign 
Affairs White Paper on the Lisbon Treaty (2009) or the Referendum Commission’s Extended Guide to the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009).
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treaty had already taken effect by the time the Supreme Court issued its decision. For ex-
ample, the Lisbon Treaty fixed the number of members of the European Parliament at 751, 
up from 736: which of the fifteen parliamentarians would give up their jobs while the Irish 
re-ratified the treaty (DFA, 2009, p. 45)? Which country would hold the old, rotating presi-
dency if the newly created permanent presidency were to suddenly and unexpectedly be 
abolished? Such questions may prove to be impossible to answer, and Ireland may thus need 
to leave the Union until it can ratify the treaty. Considering the possibility of such severe 
political consequences both domestically and at a European level, the Irish government was 
correct to take the safer route to ratification regardless of the constitutionality of the Lisbon 
Treaty. In the future, however, it would be most helpful if the Irish government submits a 
treaty to the Supreme Court for review prior to calling a referendum so that the Court may 
establish more precedents regarding the compatibility of several European practices with the 
Irish Constitution. 
Why Have EU Referendums Failed in Ireland? 
A Noncommittal Electorate
In order to succeed, proponents of Nice would have needed to overcome a particular 
weakness in the Irish electorate: that despite high levels of stated support for the Euro-
pean Union, voters generally lack enthusiasm for and knowledge about European issues. 
The Eurobarometer had continually shown the Irish were much more supportive of their 
membership in the EU than other Europeans were. However, the European Commission 
Representation in Ireland found that, “Issues having to do with the European Union are a 
minority interest in Ireland,” with half of the electorate (51%) placing themselves below the 
mid-point or registering no opinion on a scale measuring interest in European affairs (Sin-
nott, 2001, p. 3). The Eurobarometer has shown that levels of sadness over a hypothetical 
dissolution of the EU have ranged between 30% and 60% since 1973, significantly lower 
than the support levels for membership (which have ranged between 45% and 80% over the 
same period) (Sinnott et al, 2009, pp. 2-3). As a result, in order for a referendum to succeed, 
the treaty’s proponents need to overcome general lack of enthusiasm for and knowledge 
about European issues6.   
A review of Eurobarometer surveys surrounding both the Nice and the Lisbon cam-
paigns show that little has changed in the attitudes of the Irish electorate between the two 
treaties. In the months immediately preceding the first referendums on both the Nice and 
Lisbon Treaties, the Eurobarometer found levels of support of EU membership to be at 72% 
(Sinnott, 2001, p. ii) and 73% (Eurobarometer, 2008, p. 12) respectively—both well above 
the EU average. However, knowledge about the EU had appeared to increase since 2001. 
When Ireland voted on the Nice Treaty, only 12% of the electorate could answer at least 
two of three basic questions about European institutions7. Increases of the level of knowl-
edge were measurable between the two Nice referendums (Sinnott, 2003, p. i.): 57% of 
6 Richard Sinnott discusses this trend in depth in his 2001 report, “Attitudes and Behaviour of the Irish Electorate 
in the Referendum on the Treaty of Nice.”
7 True/False: (1) The EU currently consists of fifteen Member States; (2) Switzerland is a member of the European 
Union; (3) Every six months, a different Member State becomes the President of the Council of the European 
Union; (4) The euro area currently consists of twelve member states. The questioning from the Nice Survey ex-
cluded the fourth question, but all other questions were included (Sinnott et al, 2008, p. 5).
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eligible voters could answer two of four questions by 2008 (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 5). Given 
that the most commonly given reason for rejecting the Nice Treaty was because voters did 
not understand what the treaty entailed, and that voters who had less objective knowledge 
about the EU were more likely to abstain from voting or vote against the treaty, the Lisbon 
Treaty should have been more likely to pass than the Nice Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty did 
not pass, but it remained true that those claiming not to understand the treaty or the EU 
were less likely to vote and more likely to vote ‘no.’
Economic Transitions
When Ireland acceded to the European Union in 1973, it was one of the EU’s poorest 
states and thus the recipient of large subsidies. Even as most economic indicators in Ireland 
began to catch up to EU averages, Ireland still received €5826.1 billion from 1994 to 1999. 
As the Irish considered the Nice Treaty, their country was about to become a net contribu-
tor to the EU budget. The economic narrative presented during the Nice campaign held 
that the European Union was largely responsible for Ireland’s newfound wealth, and passing 
the Nice Treaty would allow other states to benefit from the same opportunities. Many 
supporters seemed to imply that the Irish were morally obligated to pass the Nice Treaty 
because of all the help Ireland had received from the EU. However, many feared the treaty 
would force Ireland to increase the low corporate tax rate credited with much of the Celtic 
Tiger’s economic rise (Miller, 2001, pp. 8-9). 
Such fears did not dissipate upon ratification of the Nice Treaty. In fact, the fear of 
an EU-mandated corporate tax heightened as Ireland considered the Lisbon Treaty. At the 
time of the Lisbon campaign, many families thus owned homes worth less than their mort-
gages. Unemployment had also begun to rise (Kelly, 2009, pp. 4-6). The Irish economy 
was contracting at the time of the Lisbon campaign, and Ireland would formally become the 
first eurozone state to enter a recession three months later (O’Brien, 2008, para. 1). Ireland’s 
boom-and-bust cycle helped boost the ‘No’ vote (compared with the Nice campaign) for 
two important reasons. It allowed the ‘No’ campaign to redefine the role of the European 
Union in the Irish economy and sharpened the views of unskilled workers who felt they had 
lost out in the EU enlargement facilitated by the Nice Treaty. 
The arguments that the European Union had done much for the Irish economy do not 
resonate during a contractionary period. However, the false claim that the Lisbon Treaty 
would force Ireland to increase its corporate tax rate continued to resonate, this time with 
added urgency and a fear of higher unemployment. The assertion that Ireland would have 
to increase its corporate tax rate was demonstrably untrue, but those who believed it were 
significantly more likely to vote against the treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 31). 
The influx of Eastern European immigrants helped fuel the boom by providing an 
ever-expanding pool of workers—eventually constituting 15% of all construction workers 
(Kelly, 2009, p. 6). However, many native Irish unskilled workers believed the immigrants’ 
presence led to a decrease in wages, and some also thought that foreign workers led to an 
increase in native unemployment levels (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 36). The veracity of this 
claim is debatable, as aggregate wage levels had been steadily increasing until the contraction 
began (including through the 2004 enlargement) (Kelly, 2009, p. 8), and many unskilled 
foreign workers returned to their native countries when jobs began to disappear (The Econ-
omist, 2009). After the Lisbon referendum, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs found 
that unskilled workers, particularly those who believed that the EU had driven Irish wages 
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down, were substantially more likely to vote against the Lisbon Treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, 
p. 34). Ireland was one of three EU members to open its borders to the new EU members 
immediately upon their accession, but it attracted a disproportionate number of immigrants 
in relation to the total native population. Workers began to sympathize with France’s fears 
of the “Polish plumber” stealing native jobs during this period. In these voters’ eyes, the fact 
that Ireland had so many foreign workers and the fact that Ireland was the only contracting 
economy in the eurozone were linked.   
Younger voters from lower socio-economic classes were less likely to support the 
European Union. Polling conducted on behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs found 
that such voters could not identify specific benefits of the European Union, but could 
identify rising interest rates, prices, and immigration levels as negative consequences of 
the EU membership (Millward Brown IMS, 2008, p. 20). Young voters were born well 
after Ireland acceded to the European Union and came of age as the Celtic Tiger grew to 
be one of Europe’s wealthiest states. It is not surprising, therefore, that they would take a 
more negative view on the European Union once the economy had soured. These voters’ 
parents and grandparents, however, have stronger memories of the era during which Ireland 
was one of Europe’s poorest countries, and tended to support the Lisbon Treaty to a much 
greater extent.
Irish Neutrality 
One of the core themes of Ireland’s statehood, one that figures prominently in their 
national dialog, has been neutrality in foreign policy (Hayward, 2002, p. 185). As a con-
stitutionally neutral nation, Ireland had been an outlier within the European Union as a 
non-NATO member. However, Ireland had joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
in 1999 after the Government reneged on a promise to hold a referendum on the issue 
(Rees, 2005, p. 63). The Nice Treaty enabled the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force for 
peacekeeping efforts, which prompted fears the EU would eventually militarize. As a result, 
the loss of neutrality became a prominent issue in the ‘No’ campaign, and several ‘No’ vot-
ers were found to have factored it into their decision (Sinnott, 2001, p. i). When this fact 
emerged after the referendum, the Irish government sought and obtained a legally binding 
declaration from other EU members (the Seville Declaration) stating that Ireland could par-
ticipate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping assignments and in the EU Common Foreign and 
Security policy under certain conditions and that the EU would respect Ireland’s neutrality. 
The Seville Declaration helped convince voters to eventually approve the Nice Treaty in 
2002.
The Lisbon Treaty clarified, rather than changed, the role of existing European defense 
structures. Furthermore, Ireland and other neutral nations had successfully negotiated exclu-
sions for neutral nations and requirements that major decisions be taken unanimously (De-
partment of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 66-67). Under Lisbon, the only changes to Ireland’s 
security policies would have been changes Ireland opted to take. Nevertheless, concerns 
about neutrality and conscription in a European army drove portions of the ‘No’ voters and 
helped explain the overwhelming tendency of women to vote against the treaty (Bruton, 
2008). The fact that this issue was so easily recycled between the campaigns demonstrates 
that the EU has not done enough to assuage voter concerns.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2010/iss1/9
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 91
Bertie Ahern’s Resignation and the Mahon Tribunal
In 2006, Prime Minister Bertie Ahern faced allegations of financial impropriety. Ahern 
announced his resignation in April 2008 during his investigation by the Tribunal of Inquiry 
into Certain Planning Matters and Payments (commonly called the Mahon Tribunal), just 
over two months before the Lisbon referendum (Quinn & Cowell, 2008, para. 8). He has 
always maintained his innocence, but hoped that his appearance before the tribunal would 
be less of a distraction during the Lisbon campaign if he resigned. Members of his cabinet 
claimed the party lost no credibility amidst these allegations, but leaders in opposition parties 
complained the tribunal could damage the ‘Yes’ campaign (RTÉ News, 2008, para. 1), es-
pecially since the Mahon Tribunal dominated the news cycle in the weeks leading up to the 
Lisbon referendum. Ahern’s replacement, Brian Cowen, was not particularly charismatic 
and never enjoyed the same level of popular support as Ahern (Qvortrup, 2009, p. 62).
Polling conducted by the European Commission throughout the campaign shows that 
Ahern’s resignation did little to restore the Irish people’s faith in the government (Euro-
barometer, 2008, p. 4). Dissatisfaction with the ruling government had a large impact on a 
voter’s likelihood of approving the treaty. The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs found 
that roughly two thirds of voters stating they were “quite dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” 
with the ruling government voted against the Lisbon Treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 23). 
Given the level of dissatisfaction with the governing coalition and with Irish political insti-
tutions in general, the ‘Yes’ campaign could not rely on the broad level of political support 
that the political elites accorded to the treaty to deliver a favorable vote.
Declan Ganley and the Libertas Institute
Prior to the campaign on the Lisbon Treaty, the anti-EU elements within Irish society 
were often disjointed and underfunded. One unique feature of the Lisbon campaign was 
the emergence of Libertas Institute, a think tank which provided some 800,000 euros to 
the ‘No’ campaign (Keena, 2009, para. 9), which allowed the ‘No’ campaign to conduct 
a large-scale professional campaign for the first time. The Irish Times portrayed Libertas as 
“simply a name being used by Galway-based Declan Ganley for the expression of his views 
on the treaty and the direction of the European Union.” Ganley is a wealthy businessman 
who has written for conservative American think tanks and who heads a defense contract-
ing firm with several former high-level American military officers, prompting concerns that 
Ganley’s involvement was part of a plot by British euroskeptics and American neoconserva-
tives to prevent Lisbon’s passing (Keena, 2008). Ganley’s chief complaint was that Ireland’s 
influence within the EU would be diminished under Lisbon, citing the decrease of Ireland’s 
voting weights, the loss of national vetoes via increased use of QMV, and the ability of the 
European Court of Justice to overturn national legislation. Ganley further complained that 
Lisbon would force Ireland to cede its own powers to Brussels, particularly in taxation and 
security policies (McKrittick, 2008). Because of the amount of money at its disposal, Lib-
ertas was able to flood Irish towns with high-quality advertising material against the treaty. 
Though Ganley’s claims tended to range from outright untruths to partial truths lacking 
proper context, his campaigns were able to give voters short, easy-to-remember, specific 
reasons to vote against the treaty8.  
8 It is worth noting that the Libertas website and all of its platforms are no longer available on the internet.
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The Defeat of the First Lisbon Referendum
On June 12, 2008, Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty by 52.3%. Turnout was 
53.1% (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. i). This means that about 28% of the total electorate voted 
against the treaty—compared with 19% of the electorate voting against Nice in the 2001 
referendum. A higher percentage of the total electorate voted against the Lisbon Treaty than 
all other European reform treaties in Ireland’s history (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 6). These results 
undermine the tendency to dismiss the Nice Treaty rejection as a fluke. At the time, some 
argued the rejection arose from complacency and low turnout9. According to this theory, 
many voters believed that there was no possibility of Nice not passing and could thus not 
be bothered to vote; still more people voted against the treaty (also assuming it would pass) 
as a small token of protest against an administration that was growing less popular.  Be-
cause of this “accident,” voters developed a greater understanding of the stakes involved in 
European reform, and turnout increased to allow for the “correct” response in the second 
referendum—the response that voters intended all along. It may be plausible for voter com-
placency to catch a government off guard and potentially prevent reform once; however, it 
is unreasonable to assert that voters “not knowing better” would derail two treaties in less 
than a decade. 
The alarming fact remains that several areas of concern to the Irish voters in the Lisbon 
Treaty are issues recycled from the Nice Treaty, which demonstrates that the Union has still 
not done enough to earn its citizens’ trust. Furthermore, as with the Nice Treaty, several of 
the common reasons for voting against the treaty are demonstrably false, showing that the 
Irish government and political parties (nearly all of which support the treaty) do a poor job 
of communicating European goals with their voters. It appears as though the voters, who 
turned out in large numbers to vote on Lisbon, did learn from the Nice debacle. One might 
argue, however, that their take-home lesson was not that European reform matters, but that 
a rejection of a treaty can yield a much-wanted concession—in this case an agreement to 
universal European Commission representation (Fitzgerald, 2009, para. 20-22). 
The Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon
Irish voters’ rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon triggered another panic among Irish and 
European elites. European Union leaders believed the fundamental institutional reforms 
contained within the Treaty of Lisbon were necessary as quickly as possible, and Ireland 
had the very real possibility of thwarting these goals. As a result, Ireland began a process 
of soul-searching after the first referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon. Two factors became 
instrumental in overturning the results of the first referendum: a series of clarifications and a 
concession from the European Council and the onset of the global economic crisis.
The European Council’s “Guarantees”
The European Council met in June 2009 to discuss the future of the Lisbon Treaty. 
At this meeting, the Irish government agreed to hold a second referendum in exchange for 
a series of agreements collectively known as the “Guarantees.” The Guarantees clarified 
several issues of concern to Irish voters. They also included a statement by the Irish govern-
ment discussing how Ireland would interpret certain clauses. However, the most important 
9 Turnout in the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice was 34%, which provided substantial justification for the 
second vote (Sinnott et al, 2009, 6).
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product of this European Council meeting—the agreement to universal Commission repre-
sentation—did not appear in the Guarantees. These Guarantees co-opted many of the ‘No’ 
campaigns talking points, giving the Government and other ‘Yes’ advocates more freedom 
to discuss the treaty on their own terms. 
The first portion of the Guarantees is the “Decision of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment of the 27 Member States of the EU, Meeting within the European Council, on the 
Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon” (known as the “Decision.”) This 
agreement addressed specific areas of contention in plain terms. In its three sections, the 
Decision addressed social policies, taxation, and security and defense, stating that the Lisbon 
Treaty would not affect Ireland’s policies on “the protection of the right to life, […] the 
protection of the family, […] and the protections of the rights in respect of education” (p. 
1), that it would not change the EU’s “competence in relation to taxation,” and that it “does 
not affect or prejudice Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality” (p. 2). It also for-
mally states that the treaty does not create a European army, that it remains a member state’s 
choice to participate in the European Defense Agency and any military operations, and that 
all states must unanimously approve any move to a common defense (p. 2). The Decision 
is a legally binding document to be registered in the Treaty Section of the UN Secretariat 
along with the Lisbon Treaty (Institute of International and European Affairs, 2009, p. 3). 
The Decision is convincing in its brevity. The treaty itself is 272 pages of legalese that 
virtually no one could be expected to understand. Thus, the ‘No’ campaign’s arguments 
could pass a certain plausibility test, as it was difficult to prove their claims were not true. 
The debate, therefore, often was about the source of an argument rather than the argument 
itself. The Decision is three pages long and written in plain English. Voters could thus easily 
ascertain for themselves what the Lisbon Treaty would and would not do with regards to 
these specific areas.
The National Declaration by Ireland affixes an Irish interpretation to the Council’s 
Guarantees. It seeks to allay concerns that Ireland would be forced to abandon its traditional 
neutrality. The Decision declares that all states would need to unanimously approve a move 
toward a common defense. In the National Declaration, the Irish government explains that 
joining a common defense would clearly violate the Irish Constitution’s requirement of 
military neutrality. As a result, the Government would need to hold a referendum authoriz-
ing an amendment to the constitution before considering such a move (p. 6). The National 
Declaration served as a promise to Irish voters that larger states could not bully Ireland into 
joining a common defense, nor can the Irish government pass such a measure over the vot-
ers’ heads. The Irish electorate would therefore hold veto power over any common defense 
plans. 
 The European Council’s most notable guarantee, however, was not formally con-
tained within the Guarantees. At the June Council meeting, the Heads of State and Govern-
ment all agreed to allow each state to keep its representative to the European Commission 
(Institute of International and European Affairs, 2009, p. 1). This concession is significant 
at both the Irish and the European level. It is significant domestically because Ireland had 
fought for universal Commission representation throughout the treaty negotiations, but 
lost. Richard Sinnott, a political scientist at University College Dublin, found that 65% of 
all voters considered Commission representation when voting in the first referendum on 
Lisbon, and those that prioritized Commission representation were more inclined to vote 
against the treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 28). Ireland’s ability to negotiate a deal to keep its 
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commissioner helped assuage voters’ fears that Irish concerns would not be voiced in the 
Union. On a basic level, permanent Commission representation ensures that Ireland would 
always maintain a presence on one of the key European institutions. More fundamentally, 
however, the Irish government proved to its voters that on important issues, Irish priorities 
would not necessarily lose out to the wishes of larger and more powerful states. 
This concession also represents a significant departure from the European Union’s 
previous negotiations with countries that had rejected European treaties. The agreement to 
universal Commission representation is the first time the member states approved a change 
that will directly affect the operations of the entire EU. When Danish voters rejected the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Denmark negotiated a series of opt-outs for itself, but the treaty 
remained the same for the rest of the EU. As discussed in Chapter III, the Seville Decla-
ration sought to ease Irish concerns following its disapproval of the Treaty of Nice, but 
it changed neither the contents nor the interpretation of the treaty itself. Following the 
Dutch and French rejections of the EU Constitution in 2005, the European Union agreed 
to renegotiate the Constitution, eventually producing the Lisbon Treaty. Arguably, treaty 
renegotiation can be a major concession. However, the most significant difference between 
the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty is format, and Lisbon’s format was designed such 
that fewer states would hold referendums on the same substantive reforms. As a result, 
the renegotiation of the Constitution was a circumvention of voters’ wishes, rather than a 
concession to them. While the 2009 Guarantees are similar to those negotiated in the 2002 
Seville Declaration to Ireland following its rejection of the Treaty of Nice, the agreement to 
alter the previously agreed upon nature of European-level reforms is unprecedented. This 
move played a sizeable role in the campaign and may have the greatest long-term impact on 
the European Union’s operations. However, the drastic weakening of the global economy 
dominated Irish concerns during the second campaign and played the largest role in revers-
ing the ‘No’ vote. 
The Onset of the Global Recession 
When Ireland voted on the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008, it was the only member of the 
eurozone to have just completed a second consecutive quarter of contraction. As a result, 
many voters did not accept arguments that the European Union helps the Irish economy. 
Several believed that the EU’s enlargement had in fact hurt Ireland’s economy. As stated 
in the introduction, former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton explained to an American 
audience that the Irish tend to view Europe “not from their hearts, but from their pock-
etbooks,” and that this sentiment served as a partial explanation for Ireland’s rejection of 
Lisbon in 2008. However, if Bruton’s assessment is correct, this line of thinking saved the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
By the second referendum on Lisbon in October 2009, the Irish economy had dete-
riorated. In May 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that Ireland would 
see the largest negative impact in the current recession (p. 1). The Irish GDP contracted by 
7.1% in 2009 (a figure which reflects some mild improvements seen in the fourth quarter 
of 2009—after the second referendum on Lisbon) (Central Statistics Office, 2010b, p. 1). 
Furthermore, unemployment stood at 12.7% in October 2009, compared with 5.5% when 
the Irish first voted on Lisbon in June 2008 (Central Statistics Office, 2010a, p. 4). Overall, 
the IMF predicted that Ireland’s economy would contract by 13.5% from 2008 to 2010 
(International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 5). 
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This contraction had a painfully large impact on one of Ireland’s biggest industries: 
construction. This sector constituted 20% of the Irish GNP in 2006 and 13% of total em-
ployment in 2008 (Kelly, 2009, p. 6). As noted earlier, a real estate bubble drove much 
of the growth in the construction industry in the 2000s. Housing costs in particular were 
overvalued prior to 2008, and there was wide availability of easy credit. These two factors 
artificially boosted the construction industry through the end of 2007 (Central Statistics 
Office, 2010b, p. 10). Ireland had also become the second most expensive place to do busi-
ness in the EU (behind Luxembourg), and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Ireland 
were falling faster than in the rest of the eurozone (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 
9). As a result, voters could predict that even when growth rates returned to normal, the 
construction workers would not be able to depend on getting their jobs back, and they may 
not be able to find work in the manufacturing sector. Ireland faces a structural readjustment 
to its economy that will disproportionately impact its poorest workers as Ireland transitions 
away from primary and secondary sector economic activities. Voters understood that EU 
membership could help ease the pains of this transition. 
The Irish economy was clearly worse off in October 2009 than it was in June 2008. 
However, if one applies Bruton’s analysis to the latter referendum, it becomes clear that two 
key differences prevented voters from deciding once again to reject the Lisbon Treaty in 
light of continued economic uncertainty. First, the global economic crisis plunged the entire 
European Union into a recession. Irish voters had held the attitude that they in particular 
had been negatively by the EU’s enlargement and the disproportionate flow of eastern Eu-
ropean immigrants into Ireland. That concern would have logically decreased when the rest 
of the European Union also faced an economic crisis. In fact, this may be modern Europe’s 
first shared trauma in which Ireland is a full participant. Meanwhile, as Ireland’s economy 
worsened, it became clear that Ireland was more secure within the European Union than 
it would have been as an independent economy. Ireland’s membership in the eurozone has 
shielded it from the currency pressures that often accompany financial crises. It has also pro-
vided Ireland access to financing from the European Central Bank, which helped maintain 
liquidity in Irish banks (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 3). Both the IMF and Irish 
voters believed Ireland’s membership in the EU would be instrumental to its recovery. 
Statistically speaking, this belief was the most important factor in reversing Ireland’s 
initial rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon. A Flash Eurobarometer conducted after the second 
referendum found that, among those who either did not participate or voted against the 
treaty in the first referendum, belief that the EU would help the Irish economy was the most 
commonly given explanation for their change of heart (2009, p. 20).  Overall, 23% of ‘Yes’ 
voters cited this belief as the most important reason for their vote (Ibid, p. 9). The youngest 
voters were most likely to cite this justification, which is significant because young voters 
were most likely to vote against the Treaty of Lisbon in the first referendum (Ibid, p. 11).
The Second Referendum on Lisbon Passes
On October 2, 2009, Irish voters approved the Treaty of Lisbon with 67.1% of the 
vote (Eurobarometer, 2009, p. 4). Turnout had increased to 59% of the electorate (Ibid, p. 
7), the highest turnout on an EU referendum since Ireland voted on the Single European 
Act in 1987 (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 6). 
Ireland’s EU Reform Treaty Referendums and Their Lessons for Europe
Conclusion: What Does This Mean for Europe?
Too many Eurocrats are stuck in their belief that European citizens will embrace 
further integration because its benefits are self-evident. Since 2001, four referendums on 
European treaties have failed in three countries. This is no coincidence, and the European 
Union can glean much from these results. One of the most significant trends to note is that 
many voters do not know much about the European Union—both by their own admis-
sion and as demonstrated by their inability to answer basic questions about the EU. More 
importantly, those who do not understand the EU or its proposed reforms tend to view the 
EU less positively and vote against its treaties when given the opportunity (if they vote at 
all—abstention rates are also much higher). In short, if they do not know, they vote no—in 
line with a popular slogan in the Nice and Lisbon campaigns. Furthermore, voters not suf-
ficiently educated on the EU can also fall prey to misinformation (such as that distributed 
by Declan Ganley). They can also misunderstand the impact of a proposed change. For 
example, many voters in the Lisbon referendum believed Ireland would go entirely without 
representation to the EU in the years it did not have a commissioner (Millward Brown IMS, 
2008, p. 14)10. For these reasons, one can question the wisdom of allowing voters to decide 
a complicated and wide-reaching set of amendments to EU treaties. However, to deduce 
that the European Union should ignore the problem by avoiding referendums would miss 
the point. What can the European Union do to keep voters informed?
The key to ensuring European success is education. Citizens in well-functioning de-
mocracies learn about their own political institutions during their primary and/or secondary 
schooling. Education about European-level governance in the individual member states is 
inconsistent, at best. This is not acceptable in an increasingly integrated EU, where countries 
have estimated that at least 10% (and in some countries much higher) of all legislation passed 
at the national level is passed to come into compliance with European regulations (Clive-
Matthews, 2009), and where the European Central Bank directly dictates many economic 
policies. In Ireland, a three-year course on civic education has been required of middle-
school students since 1997 (Curriculum Online). Its efficacy is debatable, however; program 
graduates fall in the age range that is most likely to abstain from voting and least likely to 
vote for the treaty (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 16). In the Irish case, a more focused curriculum 
on the European Union is necessary, something the Sub-Committee on Ireland’s Future 
in the European Union noted after the failure of the first Lisbon referendum (Oireachtas, 
2008, pp. 60-61). The European Union itself should also take steps to ensure a universal 
curriculum imparting a core set of knowledge (such as the duties of various European insti-
tutions and the process of passing legislation). Member states should have the opportunity 
to inject additional components into the curriculum as they see fit, and the EU should not 
dictate national curriculums in other subjects. However, the European Union must ensure 
that each of its citizens—citizens that vote in the European Parliamentary elections, citizens 
that vote in referendums on EU reform and accession treaties, citizens that live under the 
Union’s rules every day— adequately understand the workings of the EU itself. Improved 
education may not guarantee that any given European treaty will pass: voters who once re-
jected EU treaties out of apathy may find very concrete reasons to justify future ‘No’ votes. 
However, thoughtful debate will strengthen both the European Union and its opponents, 
and the EU can form a more perfect Union of its own. 
10 The loss of a commissioner was a statistically significant reason for voting against the Lisbon Treaty in research 
conducted by Millward Brown IMS (2008, p. 14) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (Sinnott et al, 2009, p. 14). 
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